Methodological framework for analysing radicalisation within prisons
The State of the Art analysis performed under the R2PRIS project has provided the conceptual basis for the development of the methodological framework for analysing radicalisation within prisons. The theoretical framework highlighted that radicalisation is a dynamic process emerging from the interaction between several groups of factors. The focus of the R2PRIS project is on prison radicalisation where we propose that radicalisation is likely to be influenced mainly by factors that are situated in three levels:
I. Individual
II. Among prisoners
III. Prison service/environment
The core assumption of the framework is that it is not merely the presence of specific personal or environmental factors that determines a prisoner to take the path to radicalisation, but the interaction between these factors. If we want to be able to prevent prisoners taking this path, we need to be aware that a systematic approach taking into account all these categories of factors and their interaction is more likely to be successful.
I. Individual
II. Among prisoners
III. Prison service/environment
The core assumption of the framework is that it is not merely the presence of specific personal or environmental factors that determines a prisoner to take the path to radicalisation, but the interaction between these factors. If we want to be able to prevent prisoners taking this path, we need to be aware that a systematic approach taking into account all these categories of factors and their interaction is more likely to be successful.
Note: Technical/scientific documents may be provided upon request. Given the sensitivity of the materials, potential harm provided from misuse, ethical and security issues, some materials may only be available to professionals from correctional services that participate in the proposed certification training.
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RRAP Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons toolset
Is an assessment process that includes a battery of instruments aiming to provide a broad assessment of inmates’ vulnerabilities and risk of radicalisation. It is part of the R2PRIS Multi-level in-Prison Radicalisation Prevention approach, which also comprises CIRA, the Critical Incidents Readiness Assessment. At this point, it is important to clarify that, as a screening tool, the present battery provides the basis for further interventions but we will not enter into the interventions’ realm. This means that prison systems can adapt future interventions based on the present assessment to the specific reality of their prison units, staff and inmates.
Consisting of three different instruments that assess the perception of three diverse audiences (prison governors/administrators, frontline staff, and technical staff), the RRAP Toolset aims to assist both individuals and prison systems in a thoughtful consideration of the factors and necessary steps to provide for thorough, well-considered opinions concerning the potential risk of future physical, radical-based violence from a known individual.
However, the applicability of these considerations, in any specific case, may depend on the situation, context, (and) discipline of the assessor (e.g., education, licensing), as well as the particular circumstances and questions for the evaluation. Therefore, the decision produced as an outcome of the assessment is on the total responsibility of the assessor, who must collect (more than) sufficient information that supports his final decision.
Indeed, it is key to understand that RRAP battery of assessment tools comprises three different levels for the assessment of the radicalisation risk and vulnerability (and, therefore, three different instruments), namely:
The toolset focuses on signalling risk and vulnerability in the general population rather than in charged or convicted terrorist offenders and comprises the following tools:
How to cite the RRAP:
Esgalhado, G., Pereira, H., Monteiro, S., Costa, V., das Neves, P. & Reis, S. (2018). R2PRIS – Radicalisation Screening Tool. https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/project-result-content/0b4a914e-064a-4dbf-b4b0-db89bcd85c21/IO2_Eng.pdf
Consisting of three different instruments that assess the perception of three diverse audiences (prison governors/administrators, frontline staff, and technical staff), the RRAP Toolset aims to assist both individuals and prison systems in a thoughtful consideration of the factors and necessary steps to provide for thorough, well-considered opinions concerning the potential risk of future physical, radical-based violence from a known individual.
However, the applicability of these considerations, in any specific case, may depend on the situation, context, (and) discipline of the assessor (e.g., education, licensing), as well as the particular circumstances and questions for the evaluation. Therefore, the decision produced as an outcome of the assessment is on the total responsibility of the assessor, who must collect (more than) sufficient information that supports his final decision.
Indeed, it is key to understand that RRAP battery of assessment tools comprises three different levels for the assessment of the radicalisation risk and vulnerability (and, therefore, three different instruments), namely:
- Individual level (vulnerable inmates): This first level can be defined as the intra-individual level, that is, the one who deals with the assessment of inmates’ beliefs, attitudes, behaviours, emotions and cognitions. The main goal of this level is the identification of vulnerable inmates and to identify in which phase of the radicalisation process they may be in;
- Inter-individual/group level (among inmates): This second level recognises the inmate as a social being that interacts with the environment in which he/she lives. Recognising the risks associated with contextual/environmental variables, this level aims to assess the risk associated with factors present among inmates;
- Prison and prison environment level (prison service): the Third level, offers a macro approach to the assessment of the radicalisation process, and considers the potential role of prison service, policies, and environment to the occurrence of inmates’ radicalisation.
The toolset focuses on signalling risk and vulnerability in the general population rather than in charged or convicted terrorist offenders and comprises the following tools:
- HV Helicopter View
- FBOG Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines
- IRS Individual Radicalisation Screening
How to cite the RRAP:
Esgalhado, G., Pereira, H., Monteiro, S., Costa, V., das Neves, P. & Reis, S. (2018). R2PRIS – Radicalisation Screening Tool. https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/project-result-content/0b4a914e-064a-4dbf-b4b0-db89bcd85c21/IO2_Eng.pdf
Structured Professional Judgement approach
The R2PRIS’ RRAP Multi-level in-Prison Radicalisation Prevention follows a structured professional judgement (SPJ) approach. This approach to violence risk assessment has continuously been a trending topic of discussion amongst the scientific community for the past two decades (e.g., Bloom, Webster, Hucker, & De Freitas, 2005; De Vogel & De Ruiter, 2006; Douglas, Cox, & Webster, 1999; Douglas, Ogloff, & Hart, 2003; Guy, 2008; Guy, Packer, & Warnken, 2012; Hart, Kropp, Laws, Klaver, Logan, & Watt, 2003; Hart & Logan, 2011; Herzog-Evans, 2018; Lawing, Childs, Frick, & Vincent, 2017) towards the development of its operationalisation, in order to effectively assess and manage an offender’s violence risk.
Nevertheless, its focus remains unchanged, since a defining feature of an SPJ measure is that it comprises guidelines specifically developed to assist evaluators in exercising discretion during the process of conducting a violence risk assessment. These guidelines are, in fact, checklists that encompass various factors that have been empirically associated with an increased risk for violence. The use of these empirically derived guidelines – as in an aide-mémoire method – follows a structured, but flexible and nonlinear manner (i.e., risk is presumed not to be a simple linear function of the total number risk factors presented in a particular case) (Douglas, Cox, & Webster, 1999; Hart, 2008). This approach takes into account the “individual manifestation and relevance of each item for the particular individual” (Guy, Packer, & Warnken, 2012, p. 271) instead of following a simplistic, additive model of risk, where more risk factors represent greater risk.
Nevertheless, its focus remains unchanged, since a defining feature of an SPJ measure is that it comprises guidelines specifically developed to assist evaluators in exercising discretion during the process of conducting a violence risk assessment. These guidelines are, in fact, checklists that encompass various factors that have been empirically associated with an increased risk for violence. The use of these empirically derived guidelines – as in an aide-mémoire method – follows a structured, but flexible and nonlinear manner (i.e., risk is presumed not to be a simple linear function of the total number risk factors presented in a particular case) (Douglas, Cox, & Webster, 1999; Hart, 2008). This approach takes into account the “individual manifestation and relevance of each item for the particular individual” (Guy, Packer, & Warnken, 2012, p. 271) instead of following a simplistic, additive model of risk, where more risk factors represent greater risk.
According to Guy (2008), guidelines presented within an SPJ framework should follow be threefold:
Additionally, an SPJ framework should comprise six different stages (Doyle & Logan, 2012), namely:
To complete the evaluation process, the practitioner must weigh the available information alongside the specificities inherent to an individual case, basing his/her final risk judgment on those considerations and, as a concluding point, categorising an individual’s risk of acting violently (i.e., predicting/assessing future behaviour) as low, middle or high.
Since the SPJ approach was developed, several “studies provide empirical evidence that violence risk assessments completed according to the SPJ framework are (…) reliable and valuable” (Guy, 2008, p. 122), overcoming the initial deficits presented by both UCJ, UPJ and actuarial approaches, while supporting its generalisation across “varied population and contextual parameters” (p. 122). Therefore, SPJ approaches “are (considered as) the golden standard for risk assessments”, since “a practitioner has to value a set of risk indicators of which correlations with future criminal behaviours are known from earlier studies” that contain both “historical, (….) dynamic and future indicators” (Kremer, Beintema, & Spreen, 2012, p. 94-95).
- Preventive (functioning as guidance to evaluators in order for them: first, to consider both the individual and contextual factors that are believed to increase or decrease the risk of violence; and secondly, to identify specific and useful interventions for risk management and reduction);
- Structured (functioning as explicit recommendation providers to evaluators, related to the risk factors’ identification process and combining – and communicating – information about the relevance of the factors for the individual under assessment, which makes the SPJ approach incompatible with any kind of risk judgments that are based solely on one’s personal intuition);
- Flexible (assessments are individualised and contextualised, since an SPJ scheme contains a variety of factors that are expected to change over time in different ways to different individuals).
Additionally, an SPJ framework should comprise six different stages (Doyle & Logan, 2012), namely:
- Gather the maximum amount of information from the maximum reliable sources available;
- Consider the presence (and inherent relevance) of risk factors, such as current, contextual, historical, or protective;
- Develop a risk formulation containing motivators/drivers, (dis)inhibitors and destabilisers, in order for the professional to decide if ‘these’ risks are relevant (or not) to determine the individual’s potential to be violent in the future;
- Consider risk scenarios such as repetition, escalation or twists (i.e., formulate judgments about risk and protective factors and how such will impact one’s potential to violence in the future – hence, connecting SPJ’s risk assessment to risk management);
- Develop risk management strategies (after analysing the most relevant risk and protective factors);
- Summary of judgments (i.e., urgency, other areas of risk, requirement of immediate actions, and expected occurrence of the next review).
To complete the evaluation process, the practitioner must weigh the available information alongside the specificities inherent to an individual case, basing his/her final risk judgment on those considerations and, as a concluding point, categorising an individual’s risk of acting violently (i.e., predicting/assessing future behaviour) as low, middle or high.
Since the SPJ approach was developed, several “studies provide empirical evidence that violence risk assessments completed according to the SPJ framework are (…) reliable and valuable” (Guy, 2008, p. 122), overcoming the initial deficits presented by both UCJ, UPJ and actuarial approaches, while supporting its generalisation across “varied population and contextual parameters” (p. 122). Therefore, SPJ approaches “are (considered as) the golden standard for risk assessments”, since “a practitioner has to value a set of risk indicators of which correlations with future criminal behaviours are known from earlier studies” that contain both “historical, (….) dynamic and future indicators” (Kremer, Beintema, & Spreen, 2012, p. 94-95).
The R2PRIS project is co-financed by ERASMUS + programme ( KA2 - Strategic partnerships for adult education). ERASMUS + is the new EU programme for Education, Training, Youth, and Sports (2014-2020).
This website has been accomplished during the project “Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons” - 2015-1-PT01-KA204-013062 (R2PRIS), implemented with the financial support of the European Commission through the Erasmus + Programme. This publication reflects the views only of the author, The Portuguese National Agency ERASMUS+ Education and Training and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. © Developed by IPS_Innovative Prison Systems
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